



TOP SECRET

Security Information

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.SD— 37231-1
TOP SECRET CONTROL
A. C. OF S., G-2, DA

19 February 1952

ILLEGIB

General Walter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
2430 "E" Street, NW
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bedell:

I need your advice and guidance in connection with a very extensive intelligence production requirement levied upon my office by the Army Psychological Warfare Staff. The requirement entails the production by G-2 of intelligence to support a plan for covert operations in wartime, involving guerilla and other activities for the initial primary purpose of retarding the Soviet military forces. This intelligence is being produced in the form of basic dossiers for each of fifteen European countries and a more detailed study, including target folders, of each of seventy-two "operational areas" within these countries. A glance at the inclosed outline of the subjects to be covered by each dossier and the list of countries involved will indicate the magnitude of the intelligence production task we are faced with.

My people can produce the basic intelligence for these dossiers but I must look to CIA for a realistic appraisal of the resistance potential factor, the very "guts" of the entire program. It is obvious to me that the success of this covert operations plan is dependent upon the extent to which peoples now behind the iron curtain are ready, willing and able to conduct resistance operations in the form of sabotage, guerilla raids, demolitions and the like, and, most important, the conditions under which they will be willing to go into action.

Clearly, if any program for retardation by guerilla forces is to mean anything we must know whether we have any realistic basis for assuming that these people will be willing to jump into action on "D" Day. If they will not move into action on "D" Day, when will they move? D plus 60? D plus six months? Or will they stay undercover until the day they feel sure that our side is going to win? How much and what kind of logistic support must we give them and to what extent can such support be given before "D" Day? To what extent will they put themselves under our command and thereby enable us to be sure that their guerilla activities are coordinated with our conventional military activities? If these people will not put themselves under the command of our officers, is there any type of liaison contact which will insure at least strong U. S. guidance of their activities? If the resistance potential behind the iron curtain is the type that will remain dormant

Army review(s) completed.

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Soviet Information


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until they can assess the ability of our side to win the final battle, to what extent could we count on them to provide at least escape and evasion support to purely American ranger-type personnel dropped in at specific points to carry out sabotage, etc.?

These are difficult questions, but they are the type of questions that can only be answered by your experts in the business - and furthermore, we cannot develop realistic intelligence on the subject until we have the answers.

At the last IAC meeting you made mention of the great need for cold, factual data rather than vague estimates; right now I am badly in need of cold, factual data in terms of a realistic appraisal of the resistance potential in the satellite areas and in Western Russia. I will greatly appreciate your help in this matter, and it will enable my office to produce intelligence "dossiers" that should be equally valuable to both Army and CIA/OPC.

Sincerely,


A. R. BULDING
Major General, GS
A. C. of S., G-2

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1. List of Countries
2. Dossier Outline

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TOP SECRET CONTROL
A. C. OF S., G-2, DALIST OF COUNTRIES COVERED WITH THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS

| <u>Countries</u> | <u>No. of Operational Areas</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| I Czechoslovakia | 5 |
| II Slovakia | 3 |
| III Austria | 4 |
| IV Hungary | 5 |
| V Germany | 5 |
| VI Poland | 15 |
| VII White Russia | 4 |
| VIII Ukraine | 7 |
| IX Romania | 7 |
| X Bulgaria | 4 |
| XI Lithuania | 3 |
| XII Latvia | 1 |
| XIII Estonia | 1 |
| XIV Finno-Karelia | 2 |
| XV Trans-Caucasus | 6 |
| | 72 |

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R0029004700
MEMORANDUM TO: General [REDACTED]

The attached reply to General Bolling's letter has been cleared with Mr. Dulles, General Truscott and [REDACTED] Your signature on this reply is requested. Your [REDACTED] 25X
own guidance and specific suggestions to me have been incorporated in this letter. [REDACTED] 25X
Frank G. Wisner
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Noted by : DCI

10 Mar 52-00P

7 March 1952

(DATE)

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